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"Through a Lens Darkly"
Superfund Spectacles on
Public Participation at Brownfield Sites*
Kris Wernstedt & Robert Hersh**

Introduction
1
As noted by Ortwin Renn and his co-authors several years ago,
Americans increasingly question the hazardous waste management
decisions of professional risk managers. Although citizen participation
in such decisions began with the workers' health and safety movement
of the mid-1960s, 2 it was the discovery of hazardous wastes in
residential neighborhoods a decade later that galvanized public concern.
At the Love Canal site, the startling broadcast images of a typical
suburban community mired in toxic wastes presented a new,
contemporary vision of hell, and helped lead to the passage of the
3
federal Superfund law in 1980.
Since that pivotal event, public demand for meaningful involvement
in decision making at contaminated sites has intensified. As a result
regulatory agencies have been forced to experiment with new
*

Work underlying parts of this paper was supported by U.S. EPA Grants from the

Office of Emergency and Remedial Response and Office of Policy Analysis. We
thank two anonymous reviewers, as well as our colleagues Terry Davies and Kate
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1
Ortwin Renf et al., Public Participation in Hazard Management: The Use of
Citizen Panels in the U.S., 2 Risk 196 (1991).
2 Frances M. Lynn, Public Participation in Risk Management Decisions: The
Right to Define, the Right to Know and the Right to Act, 1 Risk 95 (1990).
3 More formally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, or CERCLA, 42 USC §§ 9601-75.
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approaches to accommodate public values through such mechanisms as
citizen juries, focus groups and advisory committees. 4 More recently,
groups, ranging from national research committees to grassroots
organizations, have argued that public participation is a necessary
condition for fair and competent environmental decision making. 5
The recent report of the National Research Council's Committee on
Risk Characterization, for instance, unequivocally presses for a
deliberate process of risk characterization, calling for "appropriately
broad participation by the interested and affected parties." 6 In a
remarkable passage, it notes that, particularly for regulatory agencies in
which the public may have only limited trust, "it is usually wiser to err
on the side of too broad rather than too narrow participation." 7
Federal legislators have incorporated this idea of broad community
participation into several recent bills which address hazardous waste.
For example, in the Superfund reauthorization debate both Republicans
and Democrats have, with widespread support, drafted public
involvement titles in all major Superfund bills proposed over the past
four years. 8 Also, stakeholders around the country have lobbied for
increased local involvement in cleanup and reuse decisions at brownfield
sites. These sites are contaminated industrial and commercial properties
that have been abandoned or are underutilized, but are generally not
eligible for Superfund-financed cleanups. Interest in promoting
brownfield property recycling has exploded within the last five years,
and brownfield programs have arguably become the linchpins of current
efforts to devise more effective waste cleanup programs.
Here, we use the nearly two decades of experience with the
Superfund program to reveal some potential difficulties with public
participation in the much larger universe of brownfield sites. More
4 See, e.g., Mary R. English et al., Stakeholder Involvement: Open Processes for
Reaching Decisions about the Future Uses of Contaminated Sites, Final Report,
Waste Management Research & Education Institute, University of Tennessee (1993).
5 National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (NEJAC), Environmental
Justice, Urban Revitalization, and Brownfields: The Search for Authentic Signs of

Hope (1996).
6 Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg, eds., Understanding Risk: Informing
Decisions in a Democratic Society 23 (1996).

7

Id. at 87.

8

See, e.g., H.R. 3800, H.R. 2500, S. 1285, and S. 8.
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specifically, we argue that despite its enormous appeal, brownfield
development is likely to complicate public participation in cleanup and
reuse deliberations because of equity concerns, the reliance on private
property controls to limit exposure to residual contamination, and the
fragmented nature of local land use planning. To base this discussion on
the ground, as it were, we will use details from one hazardous waste
site, the Industri-Plex Superfund site near Boston.
Why use a Superfund site to illustrate obstacles to public
participation at brownfield sites? According to many vocal critics both
inside and outside of Congress, the Superfund program and its
administrators fail to acknowledge the importance of reusing properties
and often hinder such reuse. Brownfields redevelopment has become a
popular and, some would say, useful corrective lens by which Congress
can bring such Superfund problems into sharper focus. Our paper runs
directly against this current. Within the Superfund program, we have
found numerous examples of sites where cleanup decisions have
accommodated, even facilitated, economic development. In the midst
of the recent brownfield fervor, however, such development-friendly
efforts at Superfund sites has been little noted. In particular, brownfield
programs run the risk of having only ineffectual public participation,
because the lessons on public participation that Superfund may offer to
this newer area have not yet been sufficiently grasped.
This paper addresses this potential shortcoming by reviewing some
of these lessons. The next part presents background on U.S. browafield
programs and reviews federal statutes that govern hazardous waste sites
and state voluntary cleanup programs. It also discusses some potential
difficulties with public participation at such sites. The third part of the
paper describes the Industri-Plex Superfund site, considers how
economic developmient and cleanup processes have interacted there,
and briefly introduces major stakeholders. The fourth part further
discusses stakeholder groups and individuals, focusing on their attitudes
toward economic development and environmental risk and their views
of the appropriate scale and pace of economic development. Last, the
paper uses the Industri-Plex example to illustrate how demands for
economic reuse and environmental objectives can shape public
involvement at brownfield sites.
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Background on Brownfields
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the overwhelming
majority of brownfield sites are not Superfund sites, a distinction that
often is muddled. Most Superfund properties are more contaminated,
although the extent or severity of contamination at brownfield sites
often has not been thoroughly assessed. Superfund sites also are far
fewer in number. Even if we take the lower end of the estimate of
brownfield sites that the U.S. General Accounting Office recently
reported (130,000 to 425,000 nationwide), 9 this estimate exceeds
nearly 100 times the number of Superfund sites. Moreover, unlike
brownfield properties, Superfund sites have been subjected to a lengthy
screening and evaluation process before being placed on the National
Priorities List. Listed sites pose the most significant threats to human
health and the environment, and their cleanup is based on a polluter
pays principle - that is, those responsible for generating, transporting,
or disposing of hazardous waste must pay for cleanup. If responsible
parties cannot fund the cleanup, a site is eligible to receive money from
the "Superfund," a special trust funded from the crude petroleum tax,
10
chemical feedstock tax, and environmental income tax.
For many involved in brownfield cleanup and development,
Superfund liability is the "gorilla in the closet." Under the Superfund
statute, liability for cleanup as interpreted by numerous court cases is
retroactive, strict, and joint and several. This means that the responsible
parties can be liable for cleanup even if their activities took place before
the 1980 enactment of Superfund and even if the parties were not
negligent. Joint and several liability means that the government can
hold one or more responsible parties liable for the entire cost of cleanup,
even if others are liable. 1 1 Before these provisions came into effect in
1980, property transfers were governed by state legislation and the
12
common law doctrine of "buyer beware" guided transactions.
Prospective purchasers and developers of commercial and industrial
9 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Community Development: Reuse of
Urban Industrial Sites (1995).
10 Katherine N. Probst et al., Footing the Bill for Superfund Cleanups: Who Pays
and How? (1995).
11 Id. at 13-14.
12 See, e.g., Elizabeth Geltman, Recycling Land. Encouraging the Redevelopment

of Contaminated Property, 10 Nat. Resources & Envt 3 (1996).
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property typically did not have legal recourse against previous owners if
contamination at a property was discovered after the transfer of
ownership. Under Superfund, however, owners and operators of
properties have recourse against previous owners, and at the same time
themselves can be liable for cleanup under certain conditions even if
they were not responsible for generating, transporting, or disposing the
hazardous wastes. It is this onerous liability, critics argue, that "chills"
potential development activities. Both current and prospective owners
and operators are reluctant to transfer or develop property, for fear that
13
it may lead to expensive litigation and site cleanups.
The central premise of most brownfield programs is that regulatory
flexibility is necessary to remediate contaminated properties and bring
them back onto the tax rolls. For example, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) Brownfield Initiative and the 100 or so pilot
projects funded by the agency in the last few years1 4 have sought to
add flexibility to brownfield cleanups in two ways: first, cleanup
standards are explicitly tailored to the future use of a site so that
"Cadillac" cleanups for residential uses are not undertaken at sites
where industrial or commercial uses are planned; second, brownfield
programs offer present owners and prospective purchasers a cap on
liability for less stringent cleanups, in contrast to Superfund where
liability for cleaning up a property extends to all costs of restoring it to
a pristine state. 1 5 For many parties engaged in site cleanups including regulators, site owners/operators, developers, local economic
development corporations, and planners - this regulatory flexibility is
warranted as a way to stimulate economic development in poor and
minority neighborhoods, creating jobs, and adding tax revenues to
improve local services.
13 The conventional wisdom that the Superfund liability provisions impose high
barriers to site redevelopment has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., Public Policy
Associates, Hazardous to Your Wealth: Does Superfimd Create Barriers to Capital for
Small Business?, Working Paper 96-02, Washington, DC: Small Business Foundation
of America and the Research Institute for Emerging Enterprise, [1996]). Although the
evidence is mixed concerning whether the Superfund statute actually imposes
si.nificant barriers, the perception that it does so is widely held.
it U.S. EPA, Brownfields Pilots -Assessment and Revolving Loan Fund (1997).
15 Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfield: Shifting the
Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 Conn.
L.Rev. 789 (1995).
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To promote more flexibility, both sides of the aisle have introduced
legislation in the past 104th and current 105th Congresses to stimulate
redevelopment of brownfields. In the current Congress, for example,
Senator Lautenberg of New Jersey and other Democratic senators have
proposed the Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup Act of 1997 to
provide funding for site inventories and characterizations, establish a
revolving loan fund to help support cleanups, and promote additional
liability exemptions for brownfield development. 1 6 In the House,
Democrat and Republican members have jointly introduced the
Brownfields Remediation and Economic Development Act of 1997
and the Brownfield Economic Revitalization Act of 1997, and
Democrats have sponsored the Community Revitalization and
Brownfield Cleanup Act of 1997.17 While none of the legislative
proposals have been adopted at the time of this writing, the flurry of
activity demonstrates an interest in the nexus of environmental risk and
urban revitalization that was absent or muted as little as five years ago.
On the Executive side, several years ago EPA launched its "Brownfields
Initiative," and, more recently, the Clinton Administration proposed
tax incentives to accelerate cleanup and stimulate redevelopment.18
In addition to federal legislation to promote brownfield
redevelopment, some 35 states have established voluntary cleanup
programs to encourage cleanups at contaminated sites. 1 9 In contrast to
the federal Superfund and the various state Superfund programs which
rely primarily on enforcement and liability to initiate cleanups,
voluntary programs allow site owners and developers to approach the
state to initiate cleanups. Many of these programs include specific
incentives to encourage developers to identify potential valuable sites in
inner cities. The major incentive used to encourage developers to
cleanup contaminated sites under these voluntary programs is some
16 S. 18, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
17 H.R. 990, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); H.R. 1049, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1997).
18 Charles Bartsch et al., Federal Legislative Proposals to Promote Brownfield
Cleanup and Redevelopment in the 10 5 th Congress (1997) and Charles Bartsch et al.,
Coming Clean for Economic Development: A Resource Book on Environmental
Cleanup and Economic Development Opportunities (1996) (available from the
Northeast-Midwest Institute, 218 D Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003).
19 GAO, Superfund: State Voluntary Programs Provide Incentives to Encourage
Cleanups (1997).
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form of liability release for cleanups certified by the state. The release
essentially means that the state will not require or impose additional
cleanup requirements at a later date if the use of the property is
unchanged. Liability releases, whether in the form of covenants-not tosue, no-further-action-letters, or certificates of completion, can greatly
reduce uncertainty about long-term liability and thus encourage
property transactions.
All of the foregoing federal legislative proposals include language to
promote community involvement or public participation in brownfield
development. The Senate's Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup
Act of 1997 and the House's Brownfield Economic Revitalization Act
of 1997, for example, both would require the development of a plan
that "demonstrates meaningful community involvement." 2 0 The
Brownfields Remediation and Economic Development Act of 1997
provides for certification of state brownfield programs that allow for
liability releases only if such programs provide for public participation,
and the Community Revitalization and Brownfield Cleanup Act of
1997 includes language to "provide meaningful opportunities for public
21
participation on issues that affect the community."
Unfortunately, because brownfield development is too recent a
phenomenon we can not assume that the proposed language in the
federal brownfield bills actually would result in effective public
involvement. The odd alliance on the brownfield legislative bandwagon
and in the field suggests that an effective, inclusive public involvement
campaign must meld together diverse agenda and accommodate
possible conflict among competing stakeholders: responsible parties
may be anxious to reduce cleanup costs; municipal governments may
seek to recover blighted areas and increase tax collections; health
departments may focus on the protection of human health and
environment; political interests may be intent on devolving regulatory
authority to more local levels; and grassroots advocates may be
interested in restoring the social vitality of local communities. While
the Superfund program gives these groups a statutory right to comment
20 Section 102(b)(2)(D), S. 18, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); § 102(b)(2)(D), H.R.
1049, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
21 Section 4(2), H.R. 990, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); § 127(f)(3), H.R. 1120,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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on proposed cleanup plans - and to participate more effectively,
community groups at a site can request a technical assistance grant from
EPA to help them better understand the complexities of the cleanup
issues 2 2 - no such explicit provisions exist in the proposed brownfield
legislation. Moreover, according to a recent report, one half of the state
voluntary cleanup programs limit opportunities for public
23
participation.
Difficulties in promoting effective public participation are hardly
unique to brownfield programs, of course, but the twinning of
economic development and environmental risk reduction at brownfield
sites is likely to complicate such participation for three reasons.
First, brownfield cleanups can raise sensitive equity issues. Many
brownfield sites lie in poor and minority communities. Cleanups
tailored to industrial or commercial end uses are typically less stringent
than those based on "ideal" standard that would permit unrestricted
use of the site. Both grass roots activists and national environmental
organizations have argued that differential cleanup standards at
brownfield sites could lead to a dangerous double standard and to a
concentration of redeveloped sites in the inner cities where
contamination has not been removed but rather contained on site;24
moreover, citizens groups have stated concerns that industrial or
commercial development could generate more pollution. 2 5 One
obvious policy mechanism to address equity issues is to encourage early
and sustained public participation in discussions about cleanup
alternatives. Yet calls for strong community involvement (or control) of
cleanup and reuse decisions are likely to run squarely into a distinct and
buoyant market for brownfield remediation, spurred by private sector
entrepreneurs who may believe that limited publicity will facilitate
26
quicker sales and redevelopment and involve less uncertainty.
A second complication for broad public participation is the
increased reliance on private property controls to manage residual
contamination at brownfield sites. Private property restrictions, such as
22 42 U.S.C. § 9617.
2
GAO, supra note 19, at6.
24 NEJAC, supra note 5.
25

Barbara Ruben, Fielk of Dreams, 12 Envtl. Action 12 (1995).

26

GAO, supra note 19.
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restrictive covenants, are crucial to brownfield remediation: these legal
instruments are used to prevent persons from coming into contact with
hazardous substances left on site and are thus attractive because they
ostensibly reduce risk to a safe level without the expense of removing or
treating site contamination. Deed restrictions may proscribe postcleanup activities such as excavation of contaminated soil or well
drilling in contaminated aquifers; they are also used to prohibit the
conversion of a site from industrial to residential use (without
additional cleanup). The emergence of private property controls
presents a challenge to public involvement at hazardous waste sites
because the legal basis of deed restrictions evolves from an individual's
rights associated with private ownership of property inscribed in each
state's property law, not in environmental statutes. These controls are
likely to be worked out in detail during the latter stages of site cleanup,
at negotiations that bring together current owners, liable parties,
prospective purchasers and regulatory agencies. Because these
discussions about future land use and reuse issues often turn on
proprietary information, the public is typically not involved in these
negotiations. Thus, an important component of the cleanup decision
and arguably of site reuse can be shielded from public deliberation,
even though involved community residents could help identify those
safeguards that would be necessary to maintain the effectiveness of a
long term remedy.
A third complication for public participation is that industrial site
reuse may take place as part of a local land use and economic
development strategy but the impacts related to reuse and cleanup
might extend beyond the jurisdiction of one locality. The fragmented
character of local land use planning might make it more difficult for
public agencies to identify an affected public and mechanisms to
include them in site deliberations.
In view of these possible complications, the lessons we can distill
from properties where the public has been involved in cleanup and
economic reuse - the twin pillars of brownfield development - are
likely to be illuminating. The Industri-Plex site in Massachusetts is such
a property. Although it is not literally a brownfield property as the
proposed brownfield legislation would define it (because it already has
9 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 153 [Spring 1998]

been placed on the National Priorities List), for two decades remedial
investigation, cleanup, and development have constituted a longrunning script that no brownfield site and few if any Superfiund sites
can match. As one senior official from the EPA recently noted, the
property in all but name is the Agency's first brownfield site.
27

Industri-Plex
The Industri-Plex Superfund site occupies 245 partially developed
acres in Woburn, Massachusetts, a blue-collar suburb twelve miles north
of downtown Boston. The Boston-Lowell commuter rail line runs
through the property, while Route 128 (Interstate 95) lies roughly one
mile to the south and Interstate 93 forms the eastern boundary of the
site (see Figure 1). Woburn's sanitary landfill and commercial and light
industrial facilities surround the site on the other three sides. The
nearest residential development lies roughly one-half mile away, but
nearly 10,000 employees work within one-half mile of the site. Roughly
one-fourth of the National Priorities List site itself is developed, and
the remainder of the property has been the focus of considerable
development interest from the private sector and from a variety of
Massachusetts state agencies. This reflects in large part its large size and
prime location near the intersection of the two major highways.
For more than a century, tanneries, chemical plants, and other
manufacturers at the Industri-Plex site released or buried large volumes
of hazardous wastes, resulting in extensive soil and groundwater
degradation. In the 1970s, construction activities by a private developer
on the site released noxious odors (when the wastes of previous tannery
and glue operations were exposed to air) and led, ultimately, to the
site's placement on the National Priorities List in 1983. The Record of
Decision outlining the preferred cleanup remedy was signed in
September 1986.

27 A more complete description and discussion of the site iappears n Kris Wernstedt

& Katherine N. Probst, Land Use and Remedy Selection: Experience from the
Field--Industri-PlexSite, RTF Discussion Paper 97-27 (1997) and sources cited.
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Figure 1
Location of Industri-Plex Superfund Site in Massachusetts
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Site contamination principally includes arsenic, lead, chromium,
benzene and toluene in the surface subsoil, and groundwater. The
remedy includes several types of soil caps (to prevent exposure to
arsenic, lead and chromium), the capture and treatment of noxious
odors, and the capture and treatment of groundwater contaminated
with benzene and toluene. In addition to these engineering measures,
the cleanup also depends on "institutional controls." These controls will
proscribe what activities can take place across the site, as well as outline
the conditions by which landowners can disturb and reinstate the soil
caps. They are likely to include deed restrictions that would run with
the land, as well as new zoning regulations by the City.
The first two remedial actions - the soil cap and air system - are
largely in place, but, at the time of our study and more than a decade
after the Record of Decision was signed in 1986, the groundwater
remedy still has not been fully implemented. No adequate remedy had
yet been designed and implemented for the benzene and toluene, nor
for chromium and arsenic that ongoing investigations discovered were
also present in the groundwater. Moreover, the institutional controls
had not been implemented and still existed only in draft form.
Despite the history of contamination and uneven progress on
cleanup, the site has continued to attract considerable development
interest since its placement on the National Priorities List. This interest
has been accommodated in part by the 1989 settlement agreement
among the principal parties at the site. As part of the consent decree
among the property developer, EPA, the State of Massachusetts, and
other responsible parties, the previous developer was released from all
liability in return for transferring title of its holdings (roughly one-half
of the 245 acre site) to a Custodial Trust set up under the consent
decree. The Custodial Trust, an unusual entity for a Superfund site, was
charged with managing the holdings and arranging the sale of as much
of this largely uncontaminated parcel as possible. The Trust also
distributes proceeds from such sales to the City of Woburn, the
Remedial Trust that represents the responsible parties, and the EPA.
Under the agreement, the trustee of the Custodial Trust also will also
be released from liability, unless negligence, bad faith, or willful
misconduct in carrying out its responsibilities is found.
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In addition to the Custodial Trust, responsible parties, and federal
and state regulatory agencies, several other stakeholders have played
active roles. Non-regulatory state agencies, indcuding the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority, Massachusetts Port Authority and the
Massachusetts Highway Department, have negotiated with the
Remedial Trust regarding the remedy for the contaminated soils that
would underlie a proposed state regional transportation center that is
targeted for the northwestern part of the property. The City of
Woburn has strongly supported development efforts at the site,
particularly through its former 12-year mayor and the Woburn
Redevelopment Authority. The most active local environmental group,
For a Cleaner Environment (FACE), has participated vigorously since
the early 1980s. This group was highly successful in bringing media
attention to Industri-Plex and Wells G & H, another Superfund site
that lies several miles away. It also commented widely on documents
during the remedial investigation and earlier phases of cleanup.
The Odd Couple:
Economic Development and Environmental Quality at Industri-Plex
Given the importance of manufacturing in Woburn's economy since
the 1600s, business interests have long played prominent roles in the
City's development and local politics. In the latter part of this century,
even as most of the City has been almost wholly built out, local
redevelopment authorities have been active in promoting industrial
parks in the area. At Industri-Plex itself, this business lineage has been
very much in evidence, not only in the already-noted development
efforts that catalyzed site listing, but also in the public comments on
the 1986 Record of Decision, many of which came from advocates of
post-remediation commercial or industrial reuse of the site. Even
FACE, the local environmental group, has supported development
more than one might expect. When opposition has materialized, it has
generally centered on the pace and timing of development, rather than
on the question of how development might impede site remediation or
lead to a less stringent cleanup.
One of the consistent themes surrounding redevelopment at
Industri-Plex has been traffic management which usefully illustrates
9 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 153 [Spring 1998]

differences among the stakeholders with respect to site redevelopment
and reuse. A 1993 traffic management study anticipates having over 40
acres of land available for industrial or office development at IndustriPlex after remediation. Full development on this acreage and in the
vicinity is predicted to add 12,000 new jobs to the area and increase
peak hour traffic counts by 7,000 to 8,000 vehicle trips. The city has
responded quickly to the traffic management challenge by developing
plans to improve and extend several roads through Industri-Plex to link
up with existing roads north and west of the site. Furthermore, the
Woburn Redevelopment Authority funded an environmental impact
study and preliminary design for a new interchange from Interstate 93
that would provide ingress and egress to the heart of the site. In
addition, many city officials have vocally supported the planned state
regional transportation center. As envisioned at the time of this writing,
this transportation center would offer a 3,500 square foot commuter
rail station, 1,500 parking spaces for commuter rail and park-and-ride
users, and 900 parking spaces for the airport express bus service.
Not surprisingly, opinions about the transportation center have been
divided at several levels, and these differences have spilled over into
questions about the site cleanup. Although state agencies publicly
support the facility - pointing out that it would help the state comply
with federal Clean Air Act requirements and provide twenty-five
percent of the mass transit improvements required to be implemented
as part of the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project in
downtown Boston - some state officials are privately adverse to
locating the facility on the contaminated site. They believe that
expansion at other nearby properties is preferable, even while
acknowledging that advocates for building the transportation center at
Industri-Plex have skillfully made the siting a near fait accompli. The
Industri-Plex location has too much momentum and too many
supporters. While several Woburn City Council members have
questioned whether the city should force the state to go through the
local permitting process for the project, most officials have vigorously
pushed for the transportation center leaving few city roadblocks to its
siting.

Wernstedt & Hersh: Through a Lens Darldy 167

Probably the strongest public opposition to the project came during
the public hearing held in 1995 on a proposed waiver from an
Environmental Impact Report requirement for the project. In the
written comments leading up to the hearing and in the hearing itself,
local citizens expressed concern about the adequacy of the remediation
at the site where the transportation center would be located. In
particular, members of FACE challenged the decision to grant the
waiver when questions about the adequacy of institutional controls and
groundwater remediation remained unanswered. In addition, local
residents and business operators alluded to increased traffic, crime, and
insurance rates that might result from the transportation center. They
objected to Woburn having to bear negative impacts of the
transportation center while commuters in other parts of the Boston
commuting shed would garner the benefits. It is fair to say, however,
that many others in the community viewed site development and
associated infrastructure improvements as a way to manage existing and
future traffic congestion more efficiently and to provide the foundation
for new development.
A second twining of economic reuse and environmental quality
relates to a thirty-acre parcel at the site that required rezoning from
Industrial Park to Business Interstate (for retail use). During the public
hearings leading up to the unanimous Woburn City Council vote to
rezone the property, some citizens, while not necessarily opposing the
proposed redevelopment per se, questioned the timing of the rezoning
request. Several citizens complained that the rezoning would allow the
Industri-Plex site to develop in a piecemeal fashion without an overall,
comprehensive plan. Others feared potential increases in traffic and
competition with downtown retail areas. Woburn officials, on the other
hand, pointed out that the city would quickly receive back taxes and
augmented annual property tax revenues from the sale and reuse of the
parcel. More recently, the actual purchaser of the same thirty-acre
parcel agreed to co-fund (with the Custodial Trust) the actual design
work for the planned interchange on Interstate 93 that would provide
highway access to the site. As a condition for closing the sale, this
agreement includes a provision that the developer will receive a
prospective purchaser agreement from the EPA - a legal device that has
9 Risk.- Health, Safety & Environment 153 [Spring 1998]

been identified as a critical component in several of the proposed
brownfield bills. 2 8 This agreement will state that the developer will not
be held liable for past contamination at the site.
Thus, at Industri-Plex, development is pushing forward even
though the remedy is still underway. Somewhat ironically, in light of
the assumed pall that is cast on Superfund properties, the agreed-upon
purchase price for the property included in the agreement significantly
exceeds the top price that any other unimproved parcel has
commanded in the Boston real estate market in recent years. The unit
price of the thirty-acre parcel (i.e., the cost per acre) is reportedly four
times the unit price of other available land. The skillful and successful
advocacy by the Custodial Trust and other players for redeveloping the
site has made it a compelling success story promoting the reuse of a
contaminated property.
Turning the Lens on Brownfield
The momentum for reuse at Industri-Plex reflects the prime
location of the property, as well as the fact that years of remedial
investigation and cleanup have reduced the uncertainty about possible
contamination that prospective buyers of other properties may face.
The fact that prospective purchaser agreements are available and that
the responsible parties are on the hook for any additional remediation
of past contamination likely have helped to make the site a surprisingly
attractive development alternative. To this degree, Industri-Plex offers
a welcome antidote to the view that the Superfund law puts up
insurmountable roadblocks to economically beneficial reuse and that
the Superfund program is devoid of any successful property
reclamation.
But what lessons does the Industri-Plex story offer for brownfield
sites which, as was distinguished in section 2, differ from Superfund
properties? After all, brownfield properties are generally less
contaminated and less visible than Superftnd sites and, by virtue of the
28 Prospective purchaser agreements are between a regulator and a purchaser of a
property to enter into a covenant not to sue the purchaser of a contaminated property
for past site contamination. Since 1989, EPA has had a Superfund policy that allows
prospective purchaser agreements, where the Agency enters into a covenant not to sue
a prospective purchaser of a contaminated site in return for the purchaser's providing
either funds for cleanup or the cleanup itself.
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fact that they have escaped placement on the National Priorities List,
they typically lack the complex and adversarial entanglement of
regulators, responsible parties, and community groups found at
Superfund properties. What public participation lessons can we glean
from the Industri-Plex experience that may apply to brownfield
properties? We offer five observations.
First, the successful redevelopment of Industri-Plex and the active
participation of local government and business interests rest in no small
part on the familiar real estate adage - location matters. Without
question, the redevelopment of Industri-Plex would not attract as much
public and private interest and involvement if it were situated in a less
commercially strategic location. This point may be obvious, but it bears
noting precisely because the brownfield bandwagon often fails to
adequately temper the development enthusiasm with an appropriate
dose of real estate reality. Existing contamination of a property is not
the only factor that shapes a firm's decision to develop the property.
Clearly, a host of other concerns related to the competitive advantage
of the site, such as the skill of a local labor force, proximity to
customers and suppliers, existing transportation infrastructure,
amenities, and other quality of life issues like security, may play an
equal or larger role in the decision. 2 9 The most well intentioned
brownfield program of site cleanup and redevelopment cannot
transform a site devoid of any real estate potential into a
moneymaking, job-generating property which attracts public attention,
particpation, and scrutiny.
A perverse corollary of this brings us to our second observation,
namely that the economic development potential of a property may
hinder environmental quality objectives and mute public concern about
cleanup or environmental risk. At Industri-Plex, public interest is fixed
on development rather than cleanup and the environment. While this
partially reflects the fact that the cleanup process has been going on for
more than a decade, with active public participation in the early stages
of site discovery, investigation, and remedy selection, it is nonetheless
troubling that in a program whose goal is the protection of human
health and the environment, enthusiasm for development seemingly
29 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, 73
Harvard Bus. Rev. 3, 55-71 (May-June, 1995).
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swamped the public's interest in remediation. Clearly, those interested
in potentially large payoffs anticipated from site re-use are legitimate
members of the public, and thus merit representation in any public
involvement process. At the same time, however, there may well be a
public that, despite its silence, has concerns about health and larger
quality-of-life issues. This is a public that is less able to maintain
sustained interest in the site compared to the powerful federal, state,
and city agencies that, together with the responsible parties and the
Custodial Trust, have dominated the debate. As one central figure
notes, a person identified as a strong ally of redevelopment and the
Custodial Trust's work, there is a broad public "out there" who needs
to be involved and listened to but who remains on the sidelines.
Why might this be a problem in the brownfield context? To the
extent that reuse becomes the primary goal at brownfield sites
(arguably the emphasis that has evolved in most brownfield circles) it
would seem that cleanup and questions of environmental risk would
receive less attention. This does not necessarily mean that the health of
the public or the natural environment would be compromised, but it
should give pause to all that are concerned with both the environmental
and economic aspects of brownfield legislation. Is it possible to sustain a
robust public interest in site remediation in the face of an active and
potentially lucrative redevelopment agenda? The Industri-Plex
experience casts some doubt on this. The ponderous pace of the
groundwater remediation at the site invites speculation that the lack of
progress is due to the fact that no strong constituency appears to be
pushing vigorously for the groundwater remedy.
Third, redevelopment efforts at Industri-Plex have led to
widespread interest in the site, thus making the "affected" public a
larger group of people than just Woburn residents. Impacts from
development, most notably those associated with the regional
transportation center, are likely to bring more commuter traffic to
Woburn and neighboring towns, thereby enlarging the scope of impacts
from cleanup decisions. This presents a challenge for EPA and others to
foster more wide-ranging public participation. The Superfund program
already seeks to involve the public in cleanup. Section 117 of the
Superfund statute requires that the public be given the opportunity to
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comment on the proposed remedial plan and it provides for grants to
local groups to help them interpret technical information. Economic
development considerations may make the long-standing difficulty of
adequately defining the public and the public interest even more
problematic. These latter considerations can greatly enlarge the sphere
of affected stakeholders.
For example, the former mayor of Woburn acknowledges that
Woburn will reap the profits of an office park adjacent to Industri-Plex,
while the adjacent city of Wilmington will bear much of the increased
local traffic. To what extent do people affected by impacts that extend
beyond political boundaries have some standing or claim on public
involvement in decisions made outside of their local jurisdiction? In the
case of Industri-Plex, some stakeholders in cleanup and reuse have
dismissed the comments of at least one outspoken individual by noting
that that person is not a citizen of Woburn. However, given that the
individual in question lives in an adjacent community and in closer
proximity to the Industri-Plex site than many Woburn residents, her
residency status appears arbitrary. The lesson is that in the mixed
currents of re-use and cleanup at the site, there is no template available
to EPA or others to define the affected public or to steer public
involvement efforts appropriately. This is particularly problematic given
that EPA has long been criticized for the efficacy of its existing efforts
to involve the public in the Superfund program. 3 0 More regional-scale
decision processes may need to be established to account for the
potential regional impacts of brownfield development, yet proposed
brownfield legislation has largely been silent on this point.
Fourth, Industri-Plex provides brownfield enthusiasts a critical
lesson concerning institutional controls. Institutional controls are an
important part of the Industri-Plex remedy, making reuse possible at
the site. These controls provide some degree of protection for
contamination left on a site by controlling the kinds of land use
activities that will be permitted on the site and, therefore, the potential
for exposure. Such controls can also be important features at brownfield
sites. To the extent that institutional controls are not merely technical
appendages of a remedy, but are mechanisms that rely on complex
30 See, e.g., GAO, Superfund: EPA's Community Relations Efforts Could be
More Effective (1994).
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social and legal processes, such as local zoning, enforcement regimes of
local, municipal, or county governments, and interpretation of private
property laws, they are dynamic and vulnerable to changing societal
preferences. Their effectiveness can be limited because local
governments, who have the authority to impose controls, may have
little incentive to restrict land use or may face strong political pressure
calling for unrestricted use of a site. Moreover, local governments may
not have the technical or financial capacity to monitor and enforce the
controls. Other forms of controls that depend on private propertybased restrictions must bind both current and successive users of the site
to the restrictions specified in the deed, and yet the question of
authority - on what legal basis can the government or some other
entity challenge non-compliance with the restriction, for example - is
open to interpretation. Community participation in the development
and enforcement of these controls has not been thought through and,
based on the Industri-Plex experience, defies easy solution.
Finally, embedded in Industri-Plex and, we would argue, at many
other sites where remediation and reuse mingle, are profound questions
that relate to the political economy of local communities and the
processes by which a wide cross section of the public can participate in
decision making. Development pressures at Industri-Plex brought
powerful public and private economic interests into cleanup
deliberations, and negotiation among these interests will fundamentally
shape the community in which the contamination lies. Decisions about
cleanup and development at the site have shifted the costs and benefits
of economic revitalization and environmental remediation across space
to other jurisdictions and across time to future generations. The
decisions have provided economic opportunities, even windfalls, to
some actors while having rather more deleterious effects on others.
Conclusions

The promise of brownfield programs is enormous. Successful
brownfield redevelopment can bring increased tax revenues to local
governments, as well as needed jobs and other benefits of economic
activities to inner city neighborhoods. On the environmental side, the
programs can lead to the cleanup of contaminated properties that
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might otherwise remain untreated and a concomitant reduction in the
potential risks to human health and the natural environment.
At the same time, the enthusiasm for brownfield development
needs to be tempered. As we have seen at Industri-Plex, when economic
development considerations become entangled with site remediation,
the objectives of site cleanups are likely to change as different interests
get involved in the fray. Without an all-inclusive public participation
strategy to identify and sustain the involvement of affected
communities over the long term, some segments of the population may
be unable to participate in framing the tradeoffs between brownfield
remediation and redevelopment. A broad enfranchisement of the public
to weigh these tradeoffs and decide upon acceptable cleanup and
redevelopment objectives requires that public participation be promoted
vigorously and addressed more rigorously in brownfield legislative or
regulatory language. How exactly this can be done remains to be seen,
but the first step is to acknowledge that effective public participation at
sites with both redevelopment and environmental objectives is more
problematic than is assumed.
By shifting resources from one set of users to another, the balancing
of environmental protection and economic development that lies at the
heart of brownfield programs inevitably creates winners and losers. This
inescapable fact must be kept in mind as Congress continues to debate
brownfield legislation. Providing equal opportunities for all and
promoting conditions for fair and competent environmental decision
making in brownfield programs requires a thoughtful consideration and
open discussion about the role and form of public participation in such
programs. Without diligence, the public participation mentioned in the
vague language of current brownfield legislative proposals could suffer
the same ill fate as efforts in analogous federal programs also designed
to shape the physical, social, and economic development of
communities.
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